Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law
Volume 2

Number 4

Article 5

2007

Network and Database Security: Regulatory Compliance, Network,
and Database Security - A Unified Process and Goal
Errol A. Blake

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security
Commons

Recommended Citation
Blake, Errol A. (2007) "Network and Database Security: Regulatory Compliance, Network, and Database
Security - A Unified Process and Goal," Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 2 : No. 4 ,
Article 5.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2007.1033
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol2/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 2(4)

Network and Database Security: Regulatory
Compliance, Network, and Database Security - A
Unified Process and Goal
Errol A. Blake
4192 Medlock River Court
Snellville, GA 30039
(678) 367-7170
ErrolBlake@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
Database security has evolved; data security professionals have developed
numerous techniques and approaches to assure data confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. This paper will show that the Traditional Database Security,
which has focused primarily on creating user accounts and managing user
privileges to database objects are not enough to protect data confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. This paper is a compilation of different journals,
articles and classroom discussions will focus on unifying the process of
securing data or information whether it is in use, in storage or being
transmitted. Promoting a change in Database Curriculum Development trends
may also play a role in helping secure databases. This paper will take the
approach that if one make a conscientious effort to unifying the Database
Security process, which includes Database Management System (DBMS)
selection process, following regulatory compliances, analyzing and learning
from the mistakes of others, Implementing Networking Security Technologies,
and Securing the Database, may prevent database breach.
Keywords: Information Technology (IT), Information Security (InfoSec),
Database Management System (DBMS), Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOX), California Security
Breach Information Act (CSBIA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), The Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACT Act), The Enterprise Information
Security Policy (EISP), System-Specific Policy (SSP), Electronic
Communications Protection Act (ECPA), SQL Injection, PCI Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS).
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2 [Database Management]: Security,
integrity, and protection K.4 [Information Security]: Management of
Information. K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Ecommerce and Security. K.6.5
[Management of Information Systems]: Organization Security, Policy and
Protection.
General Terms: Management, Performance, Security, Legal Aspects
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1. INTRODUCTION
Information Security is a constantly evolving field; threats are increasing daily
and regulatory voices are tightening their compliance standards. It can be
easily stated that top level executives are sent to the guillotine after a security
breach; especially when it is sensitive information being compromised.
Most data custodians face Information Security risks on a daily basis; thus, it is
up to Information Security professionals to research these risks, threats,
exploits and vulnerabilities and take the necessary measures to secure private
information from unauthorized access and mismanagement. Upper level
management is placing more accountability in the hands of its Information
Technology department to protect sensitive information. Thus, it is assumed
that IT has the privilege to protect the company’s Information Systems. It may
be safe to say that some people are confused with the term Information
Security (InfoSec). Many believe that the term is associated with securing data
communication networks. The term is often used interchangeably with
information assurance and computer security. Information Security and
Assurance and Computer Security, share the common goals of protecting the
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information; however, there
are some subtle differences between them. The difference is stated in the
following quote: “these differences lie primarily in the approach to the subject,
the methodologies used, and the areas of concentration” (wikipedia.com,
2007). Whitman (2004) states that “businesses have become more fluid; the
concept of computer security has been replaced by the concept of information
security”. Sometimes an individual uses the term Information Technology
Security interchangeably with Information Security. Many Information
Security professionals may find this misconception offensive especially when
InfoSec is used inappropriately. To avoid any confusion, one may have to
define Information security, and Database Security. According to Whitman
(2004) “Information Security (InfoSec) is the protection of information and its
critical elements including the systems and hardware that use, store, and
transmit that information”. Wikipedia gave an excellent definition and analysis
of database security. Wikipedia’s definition and analysis is the following:
Database security is the system, processes, and procedures that protect a
database from unintended activity. Unintended activity can be categorized
as authorized misuse, malicious attacks or inadvertent mistakes made by
authorized individuals or processes. Database Security is also a specialty
within the broader discipline of computer security [now information
security] (Wikipedia, 2007).
The sources have given a clear concise definition of InfoSec and Database
Security. One will have to conclude that these two definitions are somewhat
similar. They are similar because they arrive at the same conclusion; they are
unified in gaining the same outcome. The definitions conclusions are to protect
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information from unauthorized access and misuse while the information is in
use, storage, and being transmitted. One cannot rely on the Traditional
Database Security alone to protect data confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. An effort must be made to unify the process of securing data or
information whether it is in use, in storage or being transmitted. Unifying the
Database Security process, which includes DBMS selection process, following
regulatory compliances, analyzing and learning from the mistakes of others,
Implementing Networking Security Technologies, and Securing the Database,
may prevent database breach.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Database Management System Selection. A Curriculum Development
Trend
The three major DBMSs are Oracle, SQL Sever and DB2. DBMS selection is
subjective. DBMS selection is simple; it depends on what you or your
organization’s needs are. DBMS solutions have advantages and disadvantages;
it may be wise to compare these advantages and disadvantages with other
solutions. However, Price (2007) states that there are Pre-DBMS activities one
should consider. In a recent class room discussion or forum posting dated
Monday, 19 February 2007, 10:07 AM, Price (2007) activities include:












Does the proposed DBMS align with corporate strategic goals?
Warren McFarlan’s Strategic Grid and Henderson and Venkatraman’s
Strategic Alignment Model have been used extensively to support
executive decision making processes.
Has a business case been established for the proposed DBMS system?
If so, who is the champion\sponsor and business analyst?
How much will the DBMS selection process cost to the firm?
Has a minimum or maximum range been established for (1) time to
implement the DBMS and (2) procurement of a DBMS?
What methodology will be used to manage the selection and
implementation of the DBMS? Has a Project Manager been selected?
Are the processes\activities to be supported by the new DBMS welldefined? Could these processes\activities be outsourced?
Will the DBMS be a stand-alone, departmental, divisional or an
enterprise solution?
Does the firm maintain Lesson Learned documentation from previous
software project implementation?
When\who performed the last strategic review of the firm’s IS
infrastructure? Is the strategic review documentation available? Can
the current infrastructure support the new DBMS?
When was the last time that the firm’s HR department performed a
capability analysis of the firm’s IS personnel?
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Price, (2007) further states that “the answer to these pre-DBMS selection
activities will provide valuable insight as to whether or not to use the resources
of a consulting firm. Failure to understand the importance of such questions
should serve as a red flag that management is not equipped to manage the
design\implementation\maintenance of a DBMS system”. This is a subjective
approach, but it makes sense. One will have to agree that pre-DBMS selection
activities are needed when deciding on a DBMS.
After one has conducted their analysis or answered the questions to their preDBMS selection activities, one should then identify a model used to store,
manage, and query databases. Ogbuji (2001) states “probably the most
fundamental choice to make in the DBMS hierarchy is the model used to store,
manage, and query databases. Besides affecting what software you need to
acquire, this affects the very way you will think about the data, and can be a
surprisingly hard choice to undo later on”. One will have to agree that the
selection process depends on the model one uses, whether it is Hierarchical
Model, Network Model, Relational Model, Object/Relational Model, ObjectOriented Model, Semi structured Model, Associative Model, Entity-AttributeValue (EAV) data model, or Context Model.
Database Application, Design and Implementation courses have taught that
there is a difference between the Database Model selected and DBMS that
support that particular model. For an example Oracle supports ObjectRelational Databases and Relational Database. However, most databases in the
market are simply Relational. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that
DBMS selection depends on the Database model chosen, because not all
DBMS support all Database Models. For the sake of this paper and argument,
this paper will make reference to only Relational Databases in DBMS
selection.
In today’s business environment relational database are the most popular.
Relational databases are, of course, the current king of the hill in database
technologies. This doesn't mean that more data is kept in relational databases
than any other model. A brief reason why relational databases are popular is
stated in the following quote. “Relational databases are wonderful for
discouraging redundant data and for the speed of complex queries; they also
have a huge number of tools and APIs to support them. They are best used in
situations where a lot of records are being combined and cross-referenced to
synthesize result” (Ogbuji, 2001). Ogbuji, states further that an example of
where a lot of records are being combined and cross-referenced to synthesize
result, “might be the production data of a manufacturing firm, where
information about inventory, part specifications, personnel availability, costs,
sales and supplies need to be thoroughly analyzed in order to make production
decisions” (Ogbuji, 2001).
After a Database Model is identified and selected one should select a DBMS
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that supports that model. Before a DBMS is selected one must consider the
features the DBMS has to offer. Information Security professionals who love
their craft may say that the security-related features of a DBMS is one of the
most important features one should first consider and research. Ogbuji, (2001)
strengthens the point made that one should first consider security related
features of a DBMS. “Probably the most important general features to consider
in your DBMS hunt are security-related. Consider how thoroughly the DBMS
requires authentication from users and keeps an audit trail of the accesses”
(Ogbuji, 2001). Again this paper stresses that the selection process is
subjective. Other features are dependent on what the user or company needs
and can afford. Mbuthia (2007) stated in a recent class room discussion or
forum posting dated Friday, 16 February 2007, 08:24 AM; that “the features to
consider include:









Future of the supplier and are they used significantly by others.
Cost – How much would it cost to buy, and how much would support,
maintenance and upgrades cost.
Query language - what query language is provided, and can more
complicated mathematical functions be defined.
Scalability - Are the number of rows or columns limited and so forth.
Data types - what data types are provided .
Interfaces and APIs – Do they provide for example JDBC or ODBC
interfaces? Also consider the APIs provided and in what languages.
System resources – how much of the system’s resources does it
require such as size of installation, and disk space.
Security.

Depending on the needs of the organization, DBMS selection is an important
factor and starting point for the unification of Regulatory Compliance,
Network and Database Security. Again this paper stresses that these features
are not listed in order of importance, but they are subjective. This paper agrees
with Mbuthia (2007) listing of features; however, for the purpose of this paper
security should be first.

3. APPROACH AND UNIQUENESS
This paper’s approach and uniqueness stems from the fact that there are cases
where well known company databases were breached due to some form of
hacking. Unifying the process of Regulatory compliance, Network and
Database Security may prevent the increase of database breach.
3.1 Corporate data breach
It is often said that experience is the greatest teacher and one should learn from
the mistakes of others. Recent corporate data breaches should raise a red flag to
IS professionals. Knowledge of these data breaches provides professionals with
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the information about the techniques use to access the database; then enable us
to find proper techniques to prevent such a case to happen again. The journal
article A Case Study on How to Manage the Theft of Information written by
Robert M Polstra III provides an excellent overview of corporate data breach.
Thus, the information required for the overview of this section is provided by
his article. The cases are as follows:
Case I: Citigroup
In May of 2005, Citigroup lost computer tapes that were being sent to the
credit bureau via UPS that included Social Security numbers and payment
history information for 3.9 million customers. After this event, this New
York based company has decided that it will start sending its data to the
credit bureau electronically using encryption.
Case II: ChoicePoint
ChoicePoint has made more than 50 acquisitions since 1997 to make it one
of the largest collections of personal data in the United States. ChoicePoint
sells data ‘to clients doing background checks on job and loan applicants
and conducting criminal investigations’. On February 16, 2005,
ChoicePoint went public to tell 145,000 people that identity thieves may
have gained access to their personal information including their Social
Security numbers and credit reports. ‘Authorities believe it was the work of
a group of people who used IDs stolen from legitimate business people to
set up phony businesses that contracted with ChoicePoint for ID checks,
Bernknopf (ChoicePoint’s spoke person) said’.
Case III: Egghead.com
Egghead Software was a company that opened in 1984 to sell computer
hardware and software that grew to have more than 205 stores worldwide.
Then in 1998 the company moved its business to the internet as
Egghead.com. In December of 2000, Egghead.com stated that ‘a hacker
has breached its computer system and may have gained access to its
customer database’. Jerry Kaplan, Egghead.com’s co-chairman, stated that
there was ‘no evidence’ to support that the database with the credit card
numbers for its customer was stolen but, he also could not give
confirmation that they were not stolen. ‘Egghead's inability to determine
how many of it’s customers credit cards had been compromised may mean
that the company does not have a real-time auditing system in place, said
Paul Robertson, senior developer for security service firm TruSecure Corp.
‘If you don't know how many credit-card numbers you lost, you are giving
a quick, blanket, worst-case answer--and then finding out what happened
afterwards,’ he said.’.
Case IV: New Jersey Crime Ring
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Bank employees for Wachovia Corporation, Bank of America Corporation,
Commerce Bancorp Inc., and PNC Bank stole information on 676,000
customer accounts that are all New Jersey residents. It is considered the
largest banking security breach in history by the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. ‘The suspects pulled up the account data while working inside
their banks, then printed out screen captures of the information or wrote it
out by hand, Lomia (a New Jersey Police Detective) said. The data was
then provided to a company called DRL Associates Inc., which had been
set up as a front for the operation. DRL advertised itself as a deadbeatlocator service and as a collection agency, but was not properly licensed
for those activities by the state, police said’.
Case V: LexisNexis
LexisNexis is provider of legal and business data. In March of 2005,
LexisNexis announced that the information on 32,000 people was stolen.
These breaches occurred at one of the subsidiary companies, Seisint Inc.
Seisnt Inc. was the company who was the provider of data to the Multistate
Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) system. ‘LexisNexis,
which acquired Seisint of Boca Raton, Florida, in September for $775
million, expressed regret over the incident and said that it is notifying the
individuals whose information may have been accessed and will provide
them with credit-monitoring services’. In this incident, hackers stole
username and passwords of legitimate users to access the confidential
information. In a statement, ‘Kurt Sanford, president and CEO of
LexisNexis Corporate and Federal Markets, said that the company will
improve the user ID and password administration procedures that its
customers use and will devote more resources to protecting user's privacy
and reinforcing the importance of privacy’. This security breach is very
similar to the incident that happened at ChoicePoint who is one of
LexisNexis’s competitors.
Polstra (2005) cases show a trend. The cases show that the information that
was stolen, were stored in some form of database.
Supplemental Case: TJX
On March 29, 2007, Messmer (2007) wrote an article in Network World
magazine. The article entitled UPDATE--TJX data theft called largest
ever: 45.7M credit card numbers Security breach detailed in financial
filing. Details of the article are as follows:
TJX yesterday (March 28, 2007) disclosed in financial reports that at least
45.6 million credit and debit card numbers were stolen in 2005 and another
130,000 last year by hackers who have yet to be caught. According to
Gartner security expert Avivah Litan, the volume of stolen data gives TJX
the dubious distinction of being the biggest known victim of hacker-based
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card fraud in history. ‘This is the biggest card heist we’ve heard of so far,’
said Litan, an expert in e-commerce-related security.
Earlier this year TJX publicly stated it had contacted law enforcement in
December 2006 when it ‘earned of suspicious software’ within its
computer systems. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission
filing, since last December TJX has been working with the Department of
Justice, the Secret Service, and the U.S. Attorney in the Boston office in a
criminal investigation to nab the intruders. TJX also is supplying
information to the California attorney general’s office, the Canadian
Provincial Privacy Commissioners, and the U.K. Information
Commissioner, as well as to the London metropolitan police.
The TJX data-theft case was a targeted attack by hackers, who broke in
through unprotected wireless LANs, and made their way through the TJX
network to the controllers to set up operations inside the TJX network to
capture card data. ‘They basically used a program to just capture the data.'
TJX said it expects to incur $5 million in costs in connection with the
computer intrusion. So far, customers don’t seem to be scared off by the
news. Net sales for the 2007 fiscal year at TJX were $17.4 billion, up 9%
over fiscal 2006.
Demographic and credit card information are normally stored in a database and
in most cases, there is some form of DBMS application managing the database.
The New Jersey crime ring case was different. In this case the data leak was
internal; where employees or nefarious thieves rather, were unscrupulous in
handling the accounts of others. They engaged in flagitious activities for their
personal gain. Polstra (2005) cases are prime examples of why management or
Information Security professionals must make a conscientious effort to secure
their database whether it was internal, social engineering or an external forced
entry; to ensure the confidentially, integrity and availability of data. The cases
stated above are a handful of many cases that raised eyebrows of data breach.
The TJX breach is the largest ever and it is a wake up call for the IS/IT
industry to rethink corporate security.

4. PROPOSAL
Along with DBMS selection there are other factors that play a role in the
unifying the process of securing a DBMS. This paper proposes that taking
these factors into consideration and complying with the same factors may
prevent the increase of database breach.
4.1 Regulatory Issues and Compliance
Regulatory compliance plays a role in the Database Security as well as the
selection process. Some regulatory organizations have minimum security
requirements for Databases. There are some DBMS that has more security
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features than others. The DBMS selection process may be affected by the
passing of the California Security Breach Information Act (CSBIA) (SB-1386).
It is a California state law requiring organizations that maintain personal
information about individuals to inform those individuals if the security of
their information is compromised. The Act stipulates that if there's a security
breach of a database containing personal data, the responsible organization
must notify each individual for whom it maintained information. A business
reputation is at stake if their database is compromised. The Act, which went
into effect July 1, 2003, was created to help stem the increasing incidence of
identity theft. According to the Federal Trade Commission – 2003 Consumer
Fraud and ID Theft Report (2004), “The FTC received more than half a
million consumer complaints (516,740) during calendar year 2003, up from
404,000 in 2002. These include 301,835 complaints about fraud and 214,905
identity theft reports! 42% of all complaints received by the FTC related to ID
theft, up from 40% in 2002”. Bishop (2005) made an analysis in his article
Identity theft: The Next Corporate Liability Wave. His analysis is the
following:
“Each identity theft victim will on average spend $1,495, excluding
attorneys' fees, and 600 hours of their time to straighten out the mess,
typically over the course of a couple of years. For out-of-pocket costs
alone that is, say, $2000 per victim. Multiplying that by 10,000 customer
victims equals $20 million. Adding as little as $15 per hour for the victims'
time and you get $11,000 per case or $110 million in total even before
fines and punitive damages are considered. And that's on top of the
potential impact on your company's future sales. The FTC estimates that
over 24 million people in the United States have had their identity stolen.
The $11,000 damage figure per case developed above represents over $26
billion of potential liability if fault can be ascribed to the data holder”
(Bishop, 2005).
Bishop (2005) states further that “customer and employee databases are prime
targets for identity thieves because a single vulnerability in a company's
information security can yield access to personal data on thousands of
persons”. One can see why the CSBIA and other laws were implemented.
Other regulatory compliance includes the “privacy legislation, such as the early
Federal Act of 1974 and the more recent Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA), require organizations to put in place adequate
privacy preserving techniques for the management of data concerning
individuals” (Bertino, 2005). Other federal laws impose a duty to safeguard
consumer information in certain areas. For example, “under Title V of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), financial institutions are required to take
steps to protect their customers' data, and face the possibility of fines or jail
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time for failure to comply” (Bishop, 2005). The Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACT Act) was signed by President Bush on Dec. 4, 2003; it
affects almost all companies in the U.S. Bishop (2005) states that
“Among its provisions, this law mandates that businesses must take
reasonable measures to destroy information derived from consumer credit
reports before discarding them, with effect from June 1, 2005. Shredding
papers and wiping or destroying hard drives and backup media will be
standard. From December 2006, merchants accepting credit cards must
leave all but the last five digits off printed receipts”.
Since most customer data are stored in databases and customer and employee
databases are prime targets for unscrupulous individuals, the government is
putting in place regulations to help protect the consumer from illegal activities
or information terrorism. However, professionals must also do their part to
protect their network and databases from acts of terrorism. One must ensure that
the DBMS has adequate security features that may help the organization meet the minimum
regulatory compliance requirement.

4.2 SECURING THE DATABASE

4.2.1 Policies
It is imperative that Information Security managers or personnel, Database
Administrators (DBA) as well as upper level management implement strict
guide lines and procedures in protecting the corporate network as well as their
database applications. The reason is that “IT security is focused primarily on
protecting the perimeter, but with internal data leaks and security breaches
topping the news security executives today are seeking measures to protect
customer data and corporate intellectual property across the organization”
(Dubie, 2006).
Bishop (2005) states that “in addition to the growing threat of class action
lawsuits, new laws are coming into effect to hold organizations responsible for
securing personal data. Companies should evaluate this risk and consider
taking action to reduce their potential liability”.
Database security starts with policies. Policy is defined as “a plan or course of
action as a government, political party, or business, intended to influence and
determine decisions, actions and other matters” (Whitman, 2004). Policies are
comprised of a set of rules that dictates acceptable and unacceptable behavior
within an organization. One can take a closer look at a policy as an agreement,
on what is acceptable behavior, made between the organization and individuals
who work in the organization. It is a code of conduct for the performance of
individual users.
Policies protect information, people, property and reputation. The Enterprise
Information Security Policy (EISP) is an example of how a policy guides the
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overall security program, including technology. A policy is a Management tool
that is used to control the actions or behaviors of its members with regards to
the misuse of the firm’s information technology infrastructure. The EISP, also
known as a program policy, is a general security policy that sets the strategic
direction, scope and the tone for all of an organization’s security efforts. The
EISP guides the development, implementation, and management requirements
of the information security program. The EISP must directly support the
organization’s vision and mission statements. In light of legal challenges it
must also be defensible. Thus, the EISP must meet two criteria. The existing
policy must be known by members throughout the organization, and violations
of the existing policy must be handled in a standard and consistent way.
To further understand how policy manages access control in an organization,
one could take a closer look at the System-Specific Policy (SSP). The SSP
often functions as standards or procedures to be used when configuring or
maintaining systems. “Normally a management guidance SSP is created by
management to guide the implementation and configuration of technology as
well as to address the behavior of people in the organization in ways that
support the security of information”, (Whitman, 2004). Policy forms a
foundation of trust in the organization, and it is also an important source of
support for organizational goals. It should prohibit activities that detract form
achieving organizational goal.
SSP’s are technically specific, which means that it focuses on implementation
of technical controls such as access control lists (ACL) and configuration rules.
ACL’s include the user access lists, matrices and the capability tables that
govern the rights and privileges of users. More specifically, ACL’s disclose
who can use the system, what the system can provide, when the system will
provide it, where the system will provide it and how authorized users can
access the system. Lastly, configuration rules are specific configuration codes
entered into security systems to guide the execution of the system when
information is passing through it.
Management may also consider a formal access control policy (ACP). The
ACP “determines how access rights are granted to entities and groups. The
ACP must include provisions for periodically reviewing all access rights,
granting access rights to employees, changing access rights when job roles
change and revoking access rights as appropriate” (Whitman, 2004). Many
security managers often fail to revoke access rights especially when an
employee has been terminated or has left the company. These sorts of errors
have cost companies millions of dollars. The ACP may be a part of the SSP.
However, practice has shown that it is better to have specific policies separated
even though they may be combined. The overall philosophy of the organization
is also a key to managing access controls. Dr. Michael Whitman made it clear
that “without an access control policy, systems administrators may implement
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access controls in a way that is inconsistent with the organization’s overall
philosophy” (Whitman, 2004). Policies and organizational goals must go hand
in hand. The organization and its IT security department must be heading in the
same direction, on one accord.
Policies protect information, people, property and reputation, but only to a
certain degree; even though they are in place they are often disregarded by
employees who commit flagitious crimes for personal gain. The top level
executives are then sent to the guillotine after a security breach, because the
breach was engineered from the inside.
In business it is often easy to forget the word “trust”. Often times contributing to the “bottom
line” has overshadowed a main fundamental in managing a business effectively. Many
organizations do not implement a micromanaging policy. They “trust” their employees to do the
work. Trust and policies goes hand in hand. “Trust implies that one party is willing to depend on
the other party for certain resources or action, even though negative consequences are possible”
(Woon, 2006).

Unfortunately, upper level management may not trust employees due to the
fact that other literature stated that employees are normally the main cause of
security breeches. Dubie (2006) quoted Sean Franklyn, an IT security manager
at a large financial services firm, said that “people are our weakest links. Most
of our wounds are still self-inflicted. Configuration changes that aren’t well
thought out and leave us open and exposed in certain areas are still the hardest
thing to lick”. However, creating a security minded culture is a great start in
securing database. Dubie (2006) states that “creating a security-minded culture
is making it clear why certain security policies are in place. It’s important to
make sure security measures don’t impede business processes”.
4.2.2 Current and Emerging Network Security Technologies
This section will look at the current and emerging technologies that one may
want to implement. Database security starts with implementing policies first
and then focuses on securing the network where the system lays. Policies are
the foundation for implementing security procedures. However, it is important
to note that policies and security cultures cannot depend on people and
processes alone. “There are technologies available today that helps automate
policy enforcement, data collection and protection” (Dubie, 2006). After SSPs
are implemented on the Database System, management may want to implement
hardware that protects not only the DBMS but the entire network
infrastructure. The network infrastructure ranges from physical security
(securing the building where the databases are stored or operate) to the
applications that run on or use that DBMS.
Technologies such as Network Access Control (NAC), and Outbound content
monitors, are just a few from a long list of products that may help harden your
network and database security. The concept of NAC is simple. Snyder (2006)
states NAC simplicity as “authenticate every user connecting to the network,
88

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 2(4)

then enforce an access-control policy based on who they are and other
information, such as endpoint security checks and wired vs. wireless access
method”. Again the term policy arises. One of NAC's benefits is that it gives
you the opportunity to set a policy for every user. It is important to note that
NAC is fancy, complex and expensive, but it is just a component in the bigger
picture of information security and network defense. One cannot put a price tag
on keeping information safe. If one purchased a $100,000.00 piece of
equipment and it fails to do its job; then obviously it wasn’t worth it. Careful
analysis, research and testing need to be conducted to see if it is a right fit for
the organization before heavily investing in it. Some vendors offer trial periods
for their product.
Outbound-content monitoring is an excellent way to detect if sensitive
information is leaving the network. Implementing Outbound-content
monitoring or information leakage prevention to the corporate security
architecture may help prevent the monumental ramifications a company may
face if confidential information is leaked to the public, “due a disgruntled
employee here, a careless one there” Schultz, (2007). Shultz, (2007) further
states that:
Today’s information leakage prevention monitoring systems can scan just
about any type of DataStream, including Web traffic, e-mail, FTP,
electronic faxes and instant messages. Some monitors also detect stored
sensitive data squirreled away in Word documents, spreadsheets,
PowerPoint - just about anywhere. In addition, they're much more
linguistically sophisticated than earlier products. Shultz continued by
saying Rather than just being able to search for simple keywords - like the
name 'Trent' - or a particular Social Security number, they can do
conceptual analysis. For an example outbound content monitors can
understand when a mergers-and-acquisition memo needs to be flagged
because it still contains sensitive information even though it has been
paraphrased or rewritten. "Using language analytics, they're able to detect
things that in the past would have slipped by”.
Outbound-content monitoring hardware or software protection is helpful when
there are attempts to compromise databases or the entire network.
Other technologies such as intrusion detection systems (IDS) are helpful in
protecting or monitoring the entire network. IDS help determine (by
conducting a trace to the source) whether an intrusion to unauthorized systems,
or folders are internal or external. It is important to note that if the trace is
leading to an external source, it is up to the Network Administrator to ensure
that the IDS are properly configured so that the trace ends at the perimeter of
the network. If your IDS trace through the corporate perimeter the organization
is guilty of hacking. Once your device traces the path of communication
outside the corporation perimeter the corporation has violated the Electronic
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Communications Protection Act (ECPA); and or by definition Your
organization is a hacker. One must remember that the ECPA prohibits unlawful
access and certain disclosures of communication contents; meaning that IDS
should not be tapping into a wire that it does not have access to. If the trace
leads to the outside on should contact law enforcement so that they can conduct
the trace on behalf of the company. One must remember that IDS software,
when configured incorrectly will trace beyond the perimeter. The IDS software
today is very intelligent; the software asks to define the address pool and all
subordinate address pools that the company may own, so that it knows its
boundaries. Therefore, if administrators want to trace outside the defined
address pool, the software may ask if one has legal permission to do so.
Therefore, it is very important to implement technologies that will help detect,
monitor, tract and trace suspicious activities. Perimeter security is important
because is protects the gateways to where the database systems lay. Perimeter
security is just as important as system security.
4.2.3 Other Suggestions and Technologies: Web Database Security
Technologies
One has to keep in mind that some organizations keep customer records or
data, allow their customers access to that data via the web. The recent attacks
on web based databases proves that the “Web is being used to provide users
with direct access to established databases” (Bi, Vrbsky, and Jukic 1999).
Securing these web databases is a paradigm in itself. However, this paper will
speak briefly as to how to possibly implement technologies to secure web
databases. Bi et al (1999) states that “Web database systems are typically built
using commercial off-the-shelf components, such as Web servers and database
management systems. Off-the-shelf components do address security, but
unfortunately, a combination of these mechanisms does not necessarily provide
the security and performance needed by an organization”. Web base databases
are a concern; they are vulnerable, because any device connected to the web is
at risk to an attack. These databases are deployed on web servers. Bi et al, 1999
states that:
A Web server represents the biggest potential security weakness in an
organization. A Web server program with errors or a Web server that is
misconfigured can allow unauthorized users to access confidential
information that is stored in the server. Similarly, a faulty Web server can
allow unauthorized users to execute commands on the server host machine
and modify the server system, or even gain information about the host
machine of an organization.
To prevent such a catastrophe, this paper suggests using the proxy server
technology. One must remember that a proxy server is a server that “acts as an
intermediary between a workstation user and the Internet so that the enterprise
can ensure security, administrative control, and caching service. A proxy server
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is associated with or part of a gateway server that separates the enterprise
network from the outside network and a firewall server that protects the
enterprise network from outside intrusion” (Netproject, 2007). The proxy Database
server intercepts all requests to the real Database server to see if it can fulfill
the requests itself. If not, it forwards the request to the real server. The real
server then sends the information requested, back to the proxy server. With the
proper configuration of firewall rules, routing tables and the proxy server; the
proxy server technology may help secure the DBMS or Database. If the proxy
server is compromised, the threat will not disrupt the network. One reason
being; the proxy server is most likely located in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
A DMZ is a part of the network that is neither part of the internal network nor
directly part of the Internet. It is a no-man's land between the Internet and the
internal network. This zone is NOT in the internal network, but is NOT widely
open on the Internet. A firewall or a router usually protects the DMZ with
network traffic filtering capabilities (possibly stateful packet filtering).
Therefore, if the proxy server is compromise, it does not pose a threat to the
network because of where the proxy server is located; in the DMZ.
4.2.4 DBMS programs and application security
One must not overlook the simplest form DBMS security methods such as
installing patches on the DBMS. Patches help prevent the exploits of
vulnerabilities especially in a SQL server environment; vulnerabilities that
include worms, Denial of service (DoS) attacks and Buffer overflow.
Guimaraes (2006), states that “these vulnerabilities can be exploited by a
remote hacker without ever having to authenticate to the server. The only thing
that needed to be done to avoid losses was to download patches for the
respective SQL Server bugs” and for other enterprise DBMS applications.
Administrators should take the initiative to change the default passwords that
are in place with the system before deploying the DBMS on the corporate
network. Passwords are supposed to be strong. Usernames and passwords such
as “system” and “system” or “sa” and “sa” or administrator and a blank
password field are not strong password. MSDN Library (2007), states that:
Passwords can be the weakest link in a server security deployment. You
should always take great care when you select a password. A strong
password has the following characteristics:







Is at least 8 characters long.
Combines letters, numbers, and symbol characters within the
password.
Is not found in a dictionary.
Is not the name of a command.
Is not the name of a person.
Is not the name of a user.
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 Is not the name of a computer.
 Is changed regularly.
 Is significantly different from previous passwords.
Microsoft SQL Server passwords can contain up to 128 characters,
including letters, symbols, and digits. Because logins, user names, roles,
and passwords are frequently used in Transact-SQL statements, certain
symbols must be enclosed by double quotation marks (") or square
brackets ([ ]).
Sometimes we tend to over look the simplest things; the simple mistakes can
cost the company millions.
One can harden the DBMS with Data encrypting tools. Tools that do data
encryption are an excellent place to start when trying to secure one’s database
application; and Solix Technologies is an excellent place to start looking. Solix
Technologies is a leading provider of enterprise data management solutions.
They have proven success in helping organizations worldwide to meet
compliance requirements, and achieve Information Lifecycle Management
(ILM) goals and strategies; Solix initially focused on securing and archiving
Oracle databases. “Solix Technologies provides best-of-breed solutions and has
partnered with leading platform and application vendors like Oracle, SAP,
Google, HP, EMC and Sun Microsystems to effectively cater to our customers
unique environments and evolving needs” (Solix, 2006). Silverthorn (2007)
gave a brief analysis of solix encryption software:
Solix has broadened the scope of its archiving software and has rechristened it as the Solix Enterprise Data Management Suite. The suite
addresses both compliance and information lifecycle management (ILM)
with four components: Secure Test and Development, Data Auditor,
Enterprise Archiving, and Application Sunsetting and Migration. The
compliance-related component, Data Auditor, monitors and reports on
archived data that has been accessed, updated, or deleted. It's a policydriven security tool that provides event notification and reporting of
database activity, and can be searched during and audit or e-discovery
inquiry”.
Again the term policy arises. Policies are the foundation to secure anything.
Sometime professionals focus on the external threats that affect databases and
forget about the internal threats. Polstra’s (2006) New Jersey Crime Ring
analysis sheds light on internal thieves. Connor’s (2006) article Solix adds
security features: Archiving software guards data via masking or encryption
quotes Brian Babineau, senior analyst for the Enterprise Strategy Group saying
“Most people worry about the external threat of accessing that information, but
with database information it is different, because developers and internal
parties have access to that information. With this software, you can mask
sensitive rows and columns in the database, so your developer resources do not
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see them” (Connor, 2006). This software is not cheap. “Prices range from
$100,000 to $400,000 for the components of Solix Enterprise Data
Management Suite, which can be purchased separately. For the mid-market,
the entry level can be as low as $60,000” (Silverthorn, 2007).This paper
suggests that careful analysis, research and testing need to be conducted to see
if it is aright fit for the organization before heavily investing in it. Before
deployment or placing the DBMS into production; one can place the DBMS
into a testing environment, populate the database, and run a series of test. One
test to consider is SQL injection. The Administrator needs to secure the DBMS
from SQL injection. E-government (2007) states that “SQL injection is the
name for a general class of attacks that can allow nefarious users to retrieve
data, alter server settings, or even take over your server if Your not careful.
SQL injection is not a SQL Server problem (as many may think), but a
problem with improperly written applications” on all DBMS. Guimaraes
(2006) gives a brief description of SQL injection.
An SQL injection is an attack to the Database as a result of insecure code.
You create a web page, for example, that will allow a user to input text into
a textbox and that text will be used to build a query that will be executed
against a database. A malicious user enters malformed data into the textbox
which changes the nature of the query and allows the user to gain access to
information that he/she doesn’t have privilege to access, delete or alter data
in the back-end database.
Guimaraes explains further that the attacker can shut down databases by using
SQL injection. His explanation is stated below.
For example, consider a web page that has two input text fields, one to
enter a user name and another to enter a password. The user enters a user
name and password that matches a user name and password in the
database. A dynamically created SQL statement is used to search the
database for matching records. The user is then authenticated and allowed
access to the system. Users who enter an invalid user name and password
should not be authenticated. However, a hacker can enter malformed text
into the user name textbox to gain access to the system without having to
know a valid user name and password. By filling the username field on the
form with the string:‘; shutdown; --‘ and leaving the password blank, the
following SQL statement is executed:
SELECT user FROM all_users where username =’’;shutdown; ---‘ and
pass=’’
Note that after the shutdown with the semi-colon, there are two hyphens. In
SQL two hyphens is a comment so anything after that is not executed. For
Microsoft’s SQL Server database with default system administrator
account (sa) as the application login, the code above will shut down the
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database server. Another malicious user input could be' Or 1=1 -- for the
user name and the SQL query becomes: SELECT * FROM all_Users
WHERE UserName='' Or1=1 --' AND Password=''
The expression 1 = 1 is always true for every row in the table, and OR will
always return true if one of the expressions is true. This query will return
rows that were not intended to return.
Guimaraes (2006) states further that “there are five measures that you can take
to prevent SQL injection attacks. The author suggests that you implement as
many of these measures as possible to have multiple layers of security in your
application. That way if one of the measures is circumvented because of some
vulnerability, you are still protected”. The five measures are the following:
First, you should never trust user input. You should never use input from a
database query that has not been validated. According to the author, the
best approach to validate user input is to ‘identify the allowable characters
and allow only those characters’. Second, you should never use dynamic
SQL. SQL injection attacks are dependent on dynamic SQL queries. The
author suggests using stored procedures or SQL queries that accept
parameters. Third, you should never connect to a database using an adminlevel account. Fourth, don’t store passwords in plain text. The author
suggests that you encrypt or hash passwords, encrypt connection strings
and other sensitive data. Fifth and finally, error messages that the users see
should display minimal information (Guimaraes, 2006).
If one is paranoid of their DBMS being breeched one can implement Multilevel
Security (MLS). Guimaraes (2006) gave an explanation on MLS and how it
works. The explanation is the following:
Traditional Databases allow you to consider data in two categories:
sensitive or nonsensitive. Multilevel Security (MLS) is a feature that
allows information with different classifications to be available in an
information system, where users have different security clearances and
authorizations, and are prevented from accessing information for which
they have not been cleared or authorized. It was developed for the U.S.
military and intelligence communities. The purpose of this policy is to
separate data based upon its security classification. Classified data is stored
on dedicated systems and access is prevented to users outside the
immediate community of interest. The main drawbacks of this scheme are
redundant databases, redundant workstations, high IT infrastructure cost
and inefficiency. In MLS terminology, objects such as data tables, records
and fields are referred to as passive entities. A subject is an active process
that can request access to objects. Every object is assigned a classification
and every subject a clearance.
Classifications and clearances are collectively referred to as labels. A label
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consists of two components: hierarchical and unordered compartments,
with hierarchical component specifying the sensitivity of the data. Other
key aspects are Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Poly-instantiation.
Multilevel Security uses MAC access control to prevent the unauthorized
disclosure of high-level data to low-level users. In MAC, security is
enforced by the system as dictated in the security policy and not by the
owner of the object. Polyinstantion allows a relation to contain multiple
rows with the same primary key where the multiple instances are
distinguished by their security levels. Most DBMSs were not designed
with multilevel security in mind and there is little support for MLS, which
poses significant challenges to the database research communities. Another
approach is to take advantage of new security features contained in new
releases of the standard products. With the release of Oracle 9i, for
example, Oracle implemented Oracle Label Security that allows us to
simulate a multilevel database (at least to a certain degree). It is a built-in
row level access control for high security applications, adding a new field
for each row to store the row’s sensitive labels. Row access can be granted
or denied by comparing the user’s identity and security clearance label
with the row’s sensitive labels (Guimaraes, 2006).
There is another form of DBMS security that may be implemented to add
another level of security to a DBMS. This type of security is often
implemented by the Database Administrator (DBA). These security measures
are also the traditional DBMS securities. These include granting and revoking
privileges to data objects and implementing row and column level security.
“Traditional Database Security has focused primarily on creating user accounts
and managing user privileges to database objects” (Guimaraes, 2006). These
commands are simple and easy to execute. Granting roles and privileges allow
the DBA to keep a leash on who gets to view or manipulate data. Application
security focuses on protecting data while it is in use, storage or in transmission
from unauthorized access.
Other security issues include stored procedure security; more specifically
invokers and definers rights. Invokers and Definers rights pose security issues
for the database. There are internal personnel that may need access to certain
data; but there are some that engage in criminal activities. Invokers and
Definers rights creates and internal database vulnerability. Oracle defines and
gave a brief description of Definers rights as the following:
Definers rights stored routines are procedure or function that runs with the
privileges and access rights of its definer, and not that of the executing
user. This allows database programmers to call procedures or functions that
can read and update the database on behalf of unprivileged users, i.e.
perform tasks that the current invoker of the procedure is unable to perform
themselves (Technical Corner, 2007).
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Invoker and Definers Rights pose a security issue. It is up to the DBA and
security officials to implement proper stored procedure security. Another
security technique includes locking. Locks can be either:








Implicit locks are locks placed by the DBMS
Explicit locks are issued by the application program
Lock granularity refers to size of a locked resource
Rows, page, table, and database level
Large granularity is easy to manage but frequently causes conflicts
An exclusive lock prohibits other users from reading the locked
resource
A shared lock allows other users to read the locked resource, but they
cannot update it

DBAs and application programmers should decide whether locking the
database is appropriate or not. It is important to note that these methods of
database security are only a few from an evolving list; securing DBMSs are
based on the organization’s policies and the other issues such as regulatory
compliances.
4.3 Management Tools and Technologies
This section of the paper is not in any means trying to tell anyone what they
need to protect their database; that decision is left up to management. This
section propose a guide or something to consider for future implementation.
There are management tools that have been tested and have been approved in
meeting regulatory compliance. Andress (2006) states that “NetIQ
Vulnerability manager is one of the most well rounded product tested. While it
did not stand out in any individual area, it performed solidly across the board
in policy management, reporting, compliance checks, configuration and
remediation”.
Organizations are growing and it is unlikely that they will have one database or
DBMS on their IT infrastructure. Thus, it would be more efficient to be able to
manage all databases from a centralized area. This approach not only increase
efficiency and productivity but also improves security because everything is
monitored from one location. Dubie (2006) states that there are management
tools that can perform the centralized Database management approach; an
analysis of these tools is the following:
Computer Associates CA is making available a free distributed database
management product that could help administrators manage multiple,
heterogeneous databases across their networks. Unicenter Database
Command Center (DCC) is a Web-based database management console
customers can download to any workstation or laptop with access to a
browser, and the software does not require any client software be installed
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on databases.
DCC provides database administrators with a common look and feel when
working across various systems. This tool allows you to manage and
execute commands on various databases such as Oracle and DB2. While
each database vendor provides management tools for its own offerings, CA
says DCC lets customers perform administration tasks on DB2 UDB for
z/OS, Oracle, DB2 UDB for Linux Unix, Windows and Ingres database.
Lastly this paper will take a look at VeriSign security service as a management
tool. Many individuals at some point in time have entered credit card
information over the web. Most of these websites are “secured”. Most of these
websites use VeriSign as their “intelligent infrastructure services that enable
people and businesses to find, connect, secure, and transact, by providing
encrypted communications when viewing web pages, logging into your
account and downloading reports” (Wikipedia, 2007). VeriSign is probably the
most dominant certificate authority on the Internet at the present time. “VeriSign

operates digital infrastructure that enables and protects billions of interactions
every day across the world’s voice and data networks” (VeriSign, 2007). It is
only fitting to use their product in this paper, because of their product
reliability and goodwill.
Messmer (2006) states that “VeriSign expanded its log-management service
beyond firewalls, operating systems and intrusion-detection systems to
collecting log data related to applications and databases”. Messmer further
states that VeriSign’s service is based on its Security Defense Appliance,
which is placed inside a corporate network to collect, analyze and store logs.
Expanding the log-management service allows the service to collect raw data
or just the security-related events pertaining to applications and databases of
corporate customers” (Messmer, 2006). christened her article by quoting Kelly
Kavanagh, Gartner analyst in information security and privacy; where he states
that ‘centralized logging and monitoring of application-level events is being
driven by regulatory compliance, highly publicized data theft incidents and
targeted application-level attacks’. Again this paper shows that regulatory
compliance plays an important role in Network and Database security.
5. RESULT AND CONTRIBUTION - UNIFYING THE PROCESS OF
DATABASE SECURITY
There are misconceptions that Database security is securing the database. Guimaraes (2006)
states that “Traditional Database Security has focused primarily on securing the

Database, with minor emphasis on securing the Operating System and the
Database Management System (DBMS)”. Database security should be a
unified process, which starts from the corporate network infrastructure to pre
DBMS activities (education and research) to DBMS programs and application
security. Wikipedia states that “Database security can begin with the process
of creation and publishing of appropriate security standards for the database
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environment. The standards may include specific controls for the various
relevant database platforms; a set of best practices that cross over the
platforms; and linkages of the standards to higher level polices and
governmental regulations” (Wikipedia, 2007). Selecting the proper DBMS may
be influenced by government regulations. One must ensure that the DBMS
meet the regulator’s minimum requirements, but it is up to us as professionals
to implement technologies, procedures and best practices so that we operate at
a higher standard than what is required.
Policies are the foundation for securing information. Policies are comprised of
a set of rules that dictates acceptable and unacceptable behavior within an
organization. One can take a closer look at a policy as an agreement, on what is
acceptable behavior, made between the organization and individuals who work
in the organization. It is a code of conduct for the performance of individual
users. Policies protect information, people, property and reputation.
Establishing an EISP and SSPs and ensuring that personnel follow those
policies may prevent upper level management from going to the guillotine.
After policies are in place it is up to management to secure the perimeter of the
corporate network.
Management must ensure that their network is tightly secured and their
systems comply with regulatory standards. This paper is highly bothered by the
Supplemental Case: TJX. The case shows lack of urgency and leadership. This
paper initially stressed that IS professionals should keep abreast with current
happenings in the industry and learn from the mistakes of others so that one
does not make similar mistakes. This paper proves that TJX and others are not
implementing measures to safe guard their Information Systems. The Citigroup
case shows why it is important to encrypt data. It also shows that TJX did not
learn from Citigroup mistakes. Brodkin (2007) states that “hackers were able to
access such a huge amount of data indicates TJX either failed to encrypt or
truncate card numbers or did not secure encryption keys that can translate
scrambled card information.” Brodkin states further that “TJX says that they
encrypted some card data, but they believe hackers had access to the
decryption tool”. Hopefully, the hackers performed an extensive search to
obtain the decryption tool, to perform their criminal acts. Hopefully, the
decryption tool was not stored in the same databases that were hacked. This
incident shows that if there were some form of intrusion detection system (that
works) on their network, network administrators would have been able to
detect that intrusion. This paper believes that TJX did not comply with the PCI
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). “The PCI DSS is a multifaceted security
standard that includes requirements for security management, policies,
procedures, network architecture, software design and other critical protective
measures. This comprehensive standard is intended to help organizations
proactively protect customer account data.” (PCIsecuritystandards.org, 2007).
Brodkin (2007) strengthens this paper by stating in his article that “to comply
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with the PCI DSS, companies must be audited annually and be scanned for
external vulnerabilities by third party auditors at least once a quarter.” This
paper firmly believes that TJX failed to comply with the PCI DSS. TJX may
now face fines, sanctions, retrogress in goodwill and possibly lawsuits of
gargantuan proportion. The Boston Globe (2007) reported that the cost of TJX
breach soars to $256 million, which includes law suits and computer fix. If
TJX IS professionals were keeping abreast with current happenings in the
industry and learn from the mistakes of others, they would not have found
themselves in this situation. Obviously, TJX did not implement measures to
safe guard their Information Systems; they did not comply with PCI DSS.
Further analysis of the PCI DSS states that:
The PCI DSS January 2005 version has been enhanced in the PCI DSS
Version 1.1. The PCI DSS January 2005 version may no longer be used for
PCI DSS compliance validation after December 31, 2006. The PCI DSS
version 1.1, a set of comprehensive requirements for enhancing payment
account data security, was developed by the founding payment brands of
the PCI Security Standards Council, including American Express, Discover
Financial Services, JCB, MasterCard Worldwide and Visa International, to
help facilitate the broad adoption of consistent data security measures on a
global basis.
The core of the PCI DSS is a group of principles and accompanying
requirements, around which the specific elements of the DSS are
organized:
Build and Maintain a Secure Network
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect
cardholder
data
Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords
and other security parameters
Protect Cardholder Data
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data
Requirement 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open,
public networks
Maintain a Vulnerability Management Program
Requirement 5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software
Requirement 6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications
Implement Strong Access Control Measures
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-toknow
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Requirement 8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access
Requirement 9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data
Regularly Monitor and Test Networks
Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and
cardholder data
Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes
Maintain an Information Security Policy
Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security.
One must notice that the standards that govern securing information such as
PCI DSS standards and other standards are a combination of Information
Security, Network Security as well as Database Security best practices. Failure
to comply with industry standards and best practices will place companies in a
similar position of TJX and others named in Polstra’s (2005) journal article. As
professionals it is imperative to comply with standards; this further shows that
Database security is a unifying process.
NAC and Outbound-content monitoring is an excellent way to detect if
unauthorized and authorized users are trying to access sensitive information or
to detect if sensitive information is leaving the Database or the network.
Implementing NAC and Outbound-content monitoring or information-leakage
prevention to the corporate security architecture may help prevent the
monetary ramifications a company may face if confidential information is
leaked to the public.
As a professional one cannot over look securing the DBMS programs and
application. Data encrypting software is an excellent place to start when trying
to secure one’s database application. When transmitting data via any medium
the data should be encrypted, especially when the data is sensitive material. If
the Citibank had encrypt its data in the first place their whole incident would
have “never happened”, and possibly Polstra (2006) would have applauded
them for taking proper security measures when transmitting sensitive data.
There are vendors (Solix) that offer software that encrypt data, while it is in
use, storage and transmission.
Applying patches to systems so that worms and hackers cannot exploit
vulnerabilities is vital. Patches help prevent the exploits of vulnerabilities
especially in a SQL server environment. Vulnerabilities that include worms,
Denial of service (DoS) attacks and Buffer overflow can be prevented by
applying the vendor’s patch. This paper explained and gave a detailed example
of SQL injection. Guimaraes (2006) gave five measures that one can take to
prevent SQL injection attacks. Guimaraes stated further that if one implements
as many of these measures as possible to have multiple layers of security in
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your application. That way if one of the measures is circumvented because of
some vulnerability, you are still protected. It is good practice to follow best
practices. Thus, it is good practice to change default passwords to strong
passwords. This paper stated Microsoft’s characteristics of a strong password.
This paper reiterates that it is good practice to follow best practices. Locking
techniques and issues regarding Definers and Invokers rights are dependant on
the DBA.
Lastly, this paper states that the centralized management approach of database
security is most appropriate because it provides the DBA with a unified
solution to manage multiple distributed databases. Therefore, database
management is equally important. Its importance is illustrated in the following
quote where Dubie (2006) states that “with an ever-increasing number of
databases being supported by enterprises, the need for unified administration is
growing”. Dubie 2006 stated further by quoting Noel Yuhanna, senior analyst
at Forrester Research, recently wrote in the "Trends 2006: Database
Management Systems" report, that “enterprises want a unified solution to
simplify administration, reduce cost and improve operational efficiency" and
security. NetIQ Vulnerability manager, VeriSign security service, Unicenter
Database Command Center (DCC) by Computer Associates may be used as
management and security tools when securing the database. These products
and vendors offer comprehensive management solutions that can help you
reduce the total cost of database ownership, manage day-to-day operations and
increase overall service management responsiveness.
6. CONCLUSION
One may assume that cyber terrorists as well as terrorists to ones identity will
not stop plaguing networks and DBMS. Thus, it is important when selecting a
DBMS, that is has security and other features that would help protect, improve
performance, production and efficiency of the Database.
This paper believes that Database security starts with promoting a change in
Database Curriculum Development trends. Class room discussion plays a role
in helping secure databases. Classroom discussions open up real world
strategies that have been proven effective in securing databases. Students who
are apart of a masters program are required to have some form of industry
experience. The student’s industry experience is an asset within a masters
program because it helps others learn and understand different technologies,
strategies, and approaches when involved in classroom discussions. Some of
these strategies start with DBMS selection and weighing the advantages and
disadvantages of the DBMS. It is important to keep in mind that DBMS
selection depends on the Database model chosen, because not all DBMS
support all Database Models. This paper firmly believe that promoting a
change in Database curriculum development trends to facilitate discussions on
proven strategies used in the real world can be helpful in securing databases.
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Instead of relying on the traditional Database Design and Implementation
curriculum format, facilitate discussions and conduct meaningful research as a
part of the class. Employers are always open to hear other strategies that were
developed by other companies, especially when those strategies were a part of
a meaningful discussion—a classroom setting; rather than a discussion that
may be considered nefarious.
It is equally important to adhere to standards set forth by regulatory
compliance, voices of these agencies and law officials. It is important to
implement and meet the minimum standards of security that these regulatory
compliances require, but it is equally important to implement and operate
standards at a higher level. Thus, it is imperative that upper level management,
network Administrators, DBAs, and other personnel to adhere to corporate
policies. “Building a more security aware culture is finding the right mix of
processes and technology that suit the business, and then educating the IT staff
and user community on how to maintain secure practices” (Dubie, 2006).
Dubie (2006) further states that “A first step in creating a security-minded
culture is making it clear why certain policies are in place. It is important to
make sure security measures don’t impede business process, but are aligned
with the organization IS policies and strategies along with the alignment of the
organization strategies”.
Experience is the best teacher. One should keep abreast with the latest trends
and happenings in database and network security. As security professionals it
is our duty. We must also learn from the mistakes of others and take
preventative measures that those mistakes does not happen. This paper has
shown cases where hackers are using social engineering techniques (2.2 Case
II: ChoicePoint) to hack or gain sensitive information.
Database security is a unified process. Securing both the network and the
database goes hand in hand. Hackers must penetrate the perimeter before
getting to the database, thus, it is important for network administrators and
DBAs to implement technologies whether it is hardware or software that can
detect, monitor, and prevent abnormal behaviors on the network perimeter and
within the DBMS. The careful management of database is important because it
provides DBAs a unified solution to simplify administration, reduce cost and
improve operational efficiency and security. Hackers have no regard for
privacy and identity; their nefarious acts are crimes against freedom. They have
the mindset of terrorists that plagues homeland security and life itself. Hackers
are on top of their game, and so should we. Therefore, this paper has
discovered that Regulatory Compliance, Network and Database Security is a
unifying process, that may help mitigate the increasing threats and database
breach that we as professionals should work to achieve.
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